Authorities that regulate competition topics face the challenge of striking a balance between maintaining healthy competition and allowing innovation in DFS. As the frequency with which new products and services are developed and launched increases, the appropriate time window for regulatory action may get shorter. If an early intervention can hinder innovation, acting too late may enable damaging market behavior. Such authorities need constant market surveillance to act timely, mitigate risks and maximize positive effects.
In a steadier, stabilized scenario, with few entrants or launches (more common in non-digital markets), the authority tends to adopt a “wait-and-see” posture. It is a more reflexive regulatory stance, leaving room for the market to properly take off prior to implementing directed interventions.
However, DFS are intimately linked to technological innovation, which might favor a more pro-active, preemptive positioning, to keep up with the accelerated frequency of market changes. Central banks, securities commissions and telco regulators to a large extent act ex-ante, leading market agents to desired outcomes, while competition authorities act ex-post on anticompetitive business practices such as abuse of market power, and ex-ante on merger control.
For fear of nipping market development in the bud, authorities from developing economies may be tempted to leave aside competition concerns from their work plan. Even though nascent markets require special attention to their initial development, competitive topics should not be abandoned, risking unintended consequences in market structure and conduct later on.
Country Examples
The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) allowed the Chinese mobile payments market several years of an almost regulation-free development phase, before introducing a comprehensive regulatory framework in 2018. Despite initial issues with consumer protection and, thus, the need for later enforcing a stronger than desired regulation, such posture by the PBOC enabled Alipay and WeChat pay to innovate and grow, reaching almost one billion users.1
1. Pazarbasioglu, C. et al. (2020), Digital Financial Services, World Bank, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/305a39cbb6f35567db78bda6709c5cd8-0430012025/original/World-Bank-DFS-Whitepaper-DigitalFinancialServices.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2025).
The Central Bank of Kenya’s (CBK) experimental regulatory approach towards M-Pesa was key to its success after its launch in 2007. Although the legal framework in place then allowed the CBK to regulate products offered only by banks, the institution offered an initial no-objection letter to Safaricom’s service, after concluding that M-Pesa was dissimilar to banking products at the time and that it didn’t menace financial stability. Afterwards, upon development of issues in consumer protection and competition, CBK regulated M-Pesa directly.1
1. Pazarbasioglu, C. et al. (2020), Digital Financial Services, World Bank, https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/305a39cbb6f35567db78bda6709c5cd8-0430012025/original/World-Bank-DFS-Whitepaper-DigitalFinancialServices.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2025).
Most members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) instituted regulatory agencies focused on facilitating entry in digital markets, tackling the ex ante aspect of regulation, while competition authorities handle rules breached by market players. This posture is key in these innovative markets, where exclusion and gatekeeping are the most relevant competition issues.1
1. Bossone, B. et al. (2021), Developing Digital Payment Services in the Middle East and North Africa: A Strategic Approach, World Bank Group, Washington, DC, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/206121625810043720 (accessed on 30 August 2025).




