Merger control

Merger control in DFS must address the complexity of transactions that may not meet traditional thresholds for notification but pose substantial competitive risks. "Killer acquisitions"—where incumbents acquire innovative start-ups to preclude future competition—are a growing concern, particularly in markets characterized by rapid technological evolution and high entry barriers. Regulators should consider revising notification thresholds to capture deals based on transaction value or other qualitative criteria and apply a forward-looking analysis that incorporates potential competition, innovation pipelines, and access to key datasets.1;2

Effective merger review requires the adoption of new tools and theories of harm that reflect the distinct features of digital finance ecosystems. For example, a merger may reduce dynamic competition by consolidating data sources or locking in users through interoperable ecosystems. Authorities should also assess conglomerate effects where mergers combine complementary services under one digital roof, potentially raising entry barriers for rivals. Detection and proof of anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions can be done by running market studies, ad hoc investigations, incoming whistleblowing from the industry and on-site inspections. The particularities of DFS and their markets impose on authorities to keep up with the innovation pace of their supervised entities, which is attained by assembling dedicated teams on the topic and experimenting with innovative tools and technologies.

A post-acquisition or post-merger concentrated market, albeit a worrying sign, is not always a sharp or sufficient indicator of competition problems. The authority should collect as much evidence as feasible to build a solid case against market movement, which can be erroneously judged anticompetitive.

EXAMPLE: Several jurisdictions have adapted their approach to merger control, aiming to better tackle platform business, where a bilateral analysis of acquisitions doesn’t suffice. The UK demands and India recommends that market power-waging digital platforms communicate local competition authorities of intended M&As prior to their realization, while Australia proposed that a merger review be motivated by the nature of assets involved, notably data and technology3.

Notes:

1. UNCTAD (2021), Competition law, policy and regulation in the digital era: Note by the UNCTAD secretariat, https://docs.un.org/en/TD/B/C.I/CLP/57 (accessed on 30 August 2025).

2. European Commission (2021), Communication from the Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases 2021/C 113/01, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2021_113_R_0001 (accessed on 21 August 2025).

3. Wang’ombe Kariuki, R. (2024), Digital Platforms and Competition Policy in the African Continental Free Trade Area Reflections on the development of a proposed model framework for competition in the digital economy under the AfCFTA Protocol on Competition Policy.

Country Examples

Link to Pakistan case studies
Pakistan
Link to United States case studies
United States